In this chapter we examine the relationship between biological information
it has been widely applied to problems in the contemporary philosophy of the life and social sciences. This account of causation focuses on the idea that "causal relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control" (Woodward 2010, 314) . Causation is conceived as a relation between variables in an organized system that can by represented by a directed graph. A variable X is a cause of variable Y when a suitably isolated manipulation of X would change Y. This theory of causation, in it simplest form, can be used to pick out which variables are causes rather than merely correlates.
However, a great many things get identified as causes. So, for example, a gene might be a cause for a phenotype, because a mutation (a 'manipulation') would change the phenotype. But equally, a change in the environment (another 'manipulation') will be picked out as a cause if it changes that phenotype.
A comprehensive theory of causation doesn't just distinguish cause from non-cause, but can also differentiate between causes in various ways-to identify ones that "are likely to be more useful for many purposes associated with manipulation and control than less stable relationships" (Woodward 2010, 315) . A number of different ways to distinguish types of causes have been suggested, and two of these-Stability and Specificity-are particularly relevant to understanding biological information. Stability refers to whether an intervention continues to hold across a range of background conditions, and we will not pursue it here. Specificity refers to the fine-grained control that an intervention might have, controlling a gradient of change, rather than a simple on-off switch, for example (Griffiths & Stotz, 2013; Stotz, 2006; Waters, 2007; Woodward, 2010) .
The intuitive idea is that interventions on a highly specific causal variable can be used to produce any one of a large number of values of an effect variable , providing what Woodward terms 'fine-grained influence' over the effect variable (Woodward 2010, 302) . The ideal limit of fine-grained influence, Woodward explains, would be a bijective mapping between the values of the cause and effect variables: every value of E is produced by one and only one value of C and vice versa.
The idea of a bijective mapping does not admit of degrees, but in earlier work with collaborators we have developed an information-theoretic framework with which to measure the specificity of causal relationships within the interventionist account (Griffiths et al., In press; Pocheville, Under review). Our work formalizes the simple idea that the more specific the relationship between a cause variable and an effect variable, the more information we will have about the effect after we perform an intervention on the cause. This led us to propose a simple measure of specificity:
: the specificity of a causal variable is obtained by measuring how much mutual information interventions on that variable carry about the effect variable
The mutual information of two variables is simply the redundant information present in both variables. Where ( ) is the Shannon entropy of , and H( | ) the conditional entropy of X on Y, the mutual information of with another variable , or ( ; ), is given by:
Mutual information is symmetrical: ( ; ) = ( ; ). So variables can have mutual information without being related in the manner required by the interventionist criterion of causation. However, our measure of specificity measures the mutual information between interventions on and the variable . This is not a symmetrical measure because the fact that interventions on change does not imply that interventions on will change : ( ; ) ≠ ( ; ), where is read 'do C' and means that the value of results from an intervention on (Pearl, 2009 ).
This measure adds precision to several aspects of the interventionist account of causation. Any two variables that satisfy the interventionist criterion of causation will show some degree of mutual information between interventions and effects. This criterion is sometimes called 'minimal invariance' -there are at least two values of C such that a manipulation of C from one value to the other changes the value of E. If the relationship → is minimally invariant, that is, invariant under at least one intervention on , then C has some specificity for E, that is, ( ; ) > 0.
Moreover, our measure of specificity is a measure of what Woodward calls the 'range of invariance' of a causal relationship -the range of values of C and E across which the one can be used to intervene on the other. Relationships with a large range of invariance have high specificity according to our measure (Griffiths et. al., In press; Pocheville, Under review). 5 In light of the examples in Sections 2, we propose that causal relationships in biological systems can be regarded as informational when they are highly causally specific. Biological specificity, whether stereochemical or informational, seems to us to be simply the application of the idea of causal specificity to biological systems.
The remarkable specificity of reactions in living systems that biology has sought to explain since the late C19th can equally be described as the fact that living systems exercise 'fine grained control' over many variables within those systems. Organisms exercise fine-grained control over which substances provoke an immune response through varying the stereochemistry of recognition sites on antibodies for antigens.
They catalyze very specific reactions through varying the stereochemistry of enzymes for their substrates, or of receptors and their ligands. Organisms reproduce with a high degree of fidelity through the informational specificity of nucleic acids for proteins and functional RNAs. Genes are regulated in a highly specific manner across time and tissue through the regulated recruitment of trans-acting factors and the combinatorial control of gene expression and post-transcriptional processing by these factors and the cis-acting sites to which they bind. These are all important aspects of why living systems appear to be 'informed' systems, and what is distinctive about all these processes is that they are highly causally specific.
Arbitrariness, information and regulation
In this section we consider another property that has been said to essentially characterize informational relationships in biology. This is 'arbitrariness', the idea that the relationship between symbols and the things they symbolize represent only one permutations of many possible relationships between them. This is a familiar property of human languages -'cat' could equally well be used to mean 'cow' and vice-versa. Like Crick, we have so far eschewed ideas of meaning and representation, so with respect to our proposal arbitrariness would mean that the systematic mapping between values of C and E is only one of may possible systematic mappings. Sahotra Sarkar imposes just such a condition on the informational relationships in biology. Sarkar, known for his critical stance towards the use of informational language in biology, argued that "[e]ither informational talk should be abandoned altogether or an attempt must be made to provide a formal explication of 'information' that shows that it can be used consistently in this context and, moreover, is useful" (Sarkar, 2004, 261) . He makes a serious attempt to provide the required formal explication, a definition of information that both performs a significant explanatory or predictive role and applies to information as it is customarily used. He proposes two adequacy conditions for a biological or genetic account of information:
Whatever the appropriate explication of information for genetics is, it has to come to terms with specificity and the existence of this coding relationship. Sarkar's analysis of specificity is similar to Woodward's and we would urge that he adopt our information-theoretic extension of that analysis. His second condition, arbitrariness, relies on his interpretation of the Central Dogma, according to which it introduces two different types of specificity, namely "that of each DNA sequence for its complementary strand, as modulated through base pairing; and that of the relationship between DNA and protein. The latter was modulated by genetic information" (Sarkar, 1996b, 858) . Sarkar needs to distinguish these two because the relationship between DNA and RNA is not arbitrary -it is dictated by the laws of chemistry. Only the relationship between RNA and protein is arbitrary, because it depends on the available t-RNAs. Many different t-RNAs are available, and substituting these would lead to different genetic codes.
In our view, however, Crick clearly states that 'genetic information' applies to the specification "either of bases in the nucleic acid or in amino acid residues in the protein" (Crick 1958, 153) . DNA provides informational specificity for RNA as much as RNA provides specificity for amino acid chains. Ulrich Stegmann agrees that the difference between the two is "irrelevant to the question of whether they carry information: they all do" (Stegmann, 2014, 460) . There is just one type of informational specificity, and what distinguishes it from conformational specificity is its independence from the medium in which it is expressed or the mechanism by which it is transferred. Hence if arbitrariness should be regarded as an important condition for informational language in biology, it should be for the reason of this medium-independence in general, rather than the coding relationship between RNA and amino acids in particular. The coding relationship between RNA and amino acid is not the reason that led to Crick's use of the idea of information in formulating the central dogma.
Like ourselves, Sarkar aims to explicate the notion of information in such a way as to make it a useful tool for biology. But adding the second condition of arbitrariness, at least when applied just to the coding relationship, to his definition of information seems to us to come with some substantial costs. It may exclude the concept of information from what seems to us one of its most useful roles, namely as a way to compare different sources of biological specificity, as we do in Section 5. This is because many of these alternative sources of specificity, like the DNA-RNA relationship, are not arbitrary. This is not to say that arbitrary relationships play no vital role in biology. It is interesting that the notion of arbitrariness has been introduced in another area of biology that regularly deploys informational language, namely the regulation of gene expression through gene regulatory networks.
The pioneers of research into gene regulation, Francois Jacob and Jacques Monod, derived a notion of arbitrariness from their operon model (Jacob & Monod, 1961) .
The biosynthesis of the enzyme ß-galactosidase is indirectly controlled by its substrate, ß-galactosides. This indirect control is made possible by the intervening repressor of the gene, an allosteric protein, which is rendered inactive by its effector, the substrate of the enzyme expressed by the gene. The repressor thereby indirectly transduces the controlling signal.
There is no chemically necessary relationship between the fact that ß-galactosidase hydrolyses ß-galactosides, and the fact that its biosynthesis is induced by the same compounds. Physiologically useful or "rational", this relationship is chemically arbitrary -"gratuitous", one may say. This fundamental concept of gratuity -i.e., the independence, chemically speaking, between the function itself and the nature of the chemical signal controlling it -applies to allosteric proteins. (Monod, 1971, 78) Most controlling environmental stimuli have only an indirect controlling effect on gene expression, which is mediated or transduced by the processes of transcription, splicing or editing factors. The latter relay the environmental information to the genome. So the role of allosteric proteins in signal transduction due to their chemical arbitrariness that Monod has identified, could be assigned to many signaling molecules in biological signal transduction systems, just as is the case for many human-designed signaling systems. It is this arbitrariness that renders the system flexible and evolutionarily evolvable.
"The result -and this is the essential point -is that … everything is possible.
An allosteric protein should be seen as a specialized product of molecular "engineering" enabling an interaction, positive or negative, to take place between compounds without chemical affinity, and thereby eventually subordinating any reaction to the intervention of compounds that are chemically foreign and indifferent to this reaction. The way hence in which allosteric interactions work permits a complete freedom in the choice of control. And these controls, subject to no chemical requirements, will be the more responsive to physiological requirements, by virtue of which they will be selected according to the increased coherence and efficiency they confer on the cell or organism. In short, the very gratuitousness of the systems, giving molecular evolution a practically limitless field for exploration and experiment, enabled I to elaborate the huge network of cybernetic interconnections which makes each organism an autonomous functional unit, whose performances appear to transcend, if not to escape, the laws of chemistry." (Monod 1971, 78-9) The mutual information between the specificity of the environmental signal for the regulatory factor on the one hand, and the specificity of the regulatory factors for a certain gene via its regulatory sequence, are chemically arbitrary and subject to the convention of an intervening allosteric biomolecule.
The central feature of such a relationship between any two pathways is that it is subject to heritable variation. This means that an environmental stimulus may lead in future to a quite different, adaptive response by the system, if mediated by a novel signaling protein that has evolved independent specificities to both the environmental stimulus (its effector) and the appropriate regulatory sequence (its substrate). We can understand the regulation of gene expression as an internal signaling game where sender and receiver are not two organisms but parts within one plastic organism (Calcott, 2014) . The organism encounters two environments, and a different behaviour is optimal in each environment. The sender is a sense organ, or transducer, reacting to the environment by sending a signal inside the organism. The receiver is an effector converting the signal into some behaviour that changes how the organism as a whole interacts with that environment. Signaling occurs inside the organism, and the evolution of a signaling system allows it to optimally map the different environments to the appropriate behaviour. Signaling arose because the modular structure -the separation of transducer and effectorcreated a coordination problem. For the organism to respond adaptively, it needed to coordinate these parts, and a signaling system provided the solution. Signaling, from this internal perspective, is a way of building adaptive, plastic organisms. Absolute specificity turns out to be not inherent in any single biomolecule in these molecular networks but induced by regulated recruitment and combinatorial control. And it is here that we will find that the networks cannot be reduced to DNA sequences plus gene products, because many of the latter need to be recruited, activated or transported to render them functional. The recruitment, activation or transportation of transcription, splicing and editing factors allow the environment to have specific effects on gene expression (being 'instructive' rather than merely 'permissive' in the terms introduced in section 2). Some gene products serve to relay environmental (Crick) information to the genome. While in embryology and morphogenesis it is often acknowledged that environmental signals play a role in the organisation of global activities, they are rarely seen to carry information for the precise determination of the nucleic acid or amino acid chains in gene products. But this is precisely what occurs. Not just morphogenesis at higher levels of organisation, but even the determination of the primary sequence of gene products is a creative process of (molecular) epigenesis that cannot be reduced to the information encoded in the genome alone (Stotz 2006; Griffiths and Stotz 2013) .
Interestingly, concurrent with Crick's Central Dogma, the ciliate biologist David L.
Nanney acknowledged that the 'library of specificities' found in coding sequences needed to be under the control of an epigenetic control system. In other words, in addition to requiring both an analogue and a digital conception of specificity, the study of biological development requires two sources of information. In an immediate response to Crick's new picture of sequential information coded in DNA, Nanney pointed out:
This view of the nature of the genetic material … permits, moreover, a clearer conceptual distinction than has previously been possible between two types of cellular control systems. On the one hand, the maintenance of a "library of specificities," both expressed and unexpressed, is accomplished by a template replicating mechanism. On the other hand, auxiliary mechanisms with different principles of operation are involved in determining which specificities are to be expressed in any particular cell. …To simplify the discussion of these two types of systems, they will be referred to as "genetic systems" and "epigenetic systems". (Nanney 1958, 712) In a similar vein, Crick's biographer Robert Olby remarks of the Central Dogma that Clearly, in concentrating on this aspect of informational transfer he was setting aside two questions about the control of gene expression -when in the life of a cell the gene is expressed and where in the organism. But these are also questions of an informational nature, although not falling within Crick's definition. (Olby, 2009, 251, italics added) As it has turned out, many epigenetic mechanisms are strongly associated with DNA.
Developmental biologist Scott Gilbert argues that the specificity of a reaction "has to come from somewhere, and that is often a property of the genome" (2003, 349) . But since all cells start with exactly the same genetic "library of specificities" that can't be the whole story of differentiation. Nanney describes this as a developmental paradox: "How do cells with identical genetic composition acquire adaptive differences capable of being maintained in clonal heredity" (Nanney, 1989)? Gilbert indeed acknowledges that the action of a gene itself "depends upon its context.
There are times where the environment gets to provide the specificity of developmental interaction" (2003, 350) . So we conclude that while genes are seen as a key source of specificity, in biology causes are not regarded as informative merely because they are genetic, but whenever they are highly specific. A system as a whole -a higher level entity -is engaged in a process that would not happen without some aspects of the organization of that system, and which therefore needs to be understood at the higher level. But this system is composed of parts, and as the system as a whole changes, so do the parts, obviously. The relation between the process going on at the systems level and a change in one part is not because of an additional causal relation between system as a whole and that part (over and above the interaction of the part with other parts) but the relation of constitution between the system and its parts.
It is in this sense that we understand and endorse Walker and Davies' claim that, "algorithmic information gains direct, context-dependent, causal efficacy over matter" (2013, 2) . That does not just mean that the digital information within the genetic code just by itself gains such control over matter. After all, as Nanney has already realized some 65 years ago, the expression of the repository of information within DNA is in need of epigenetic control. "The algorithm itself is therefore highly delocalized, distributed inextricably throughout the very physical system whose dynamics it encodes" (Walker & Davies 2013, 5) . The causal efficacy is achieved through some "unique informational management properties. … Focusing strictly on digital storage therefore neglects this critical aspect of how biological information is processed" (Walker & Davies 2012, 2-3).
Conclusion
Sarkar has argued that the conventional account of biological information as coded instructions in the sequence of DNA nucleotides lacks explanatory power. He calls for, first, the development of a "systematic account of specificity", and second, an "elaboration of a new informational account" with wider applicability than nucleic acid alone (Sarkar, 1996a, 222) . If the latter course was to be adopted, he suggested, it would be "highly unintuitive not to regard [epigenetic specifications] as 'transfers of information' if 'information' is to have any plausible biological significance" (Sarkar 1996a, 220) . Our proposal in this paper represents a synthesis between Sarkar's two ways forward, namely a systematic account of specificity and a new approach to biological information (see Griffiths et al., Forthcoming; Pocheville, Under review).
Biological specificity is simply causal specificity in biological systems. Causal specificity is a degree property of causal relationships -the more specific a relationship the more apt it is for the exercise of fine-grained control over the effect.
In section 3 we gave a brief summary of how this property can be measured using tools from information theory. Informational language in biology represents a way to talk about specificity. No doubt informational language is used for many other purposes in biology as well, but the cases we have presented in which it relates to specificity are central to molecular and developmental biology. As a result we feel justified in calling our information-theoretic analysis of specificity an analysis of biological information.
What is distinctive about living systems, we would argue, is that they are structured so that many of their internal processes have an outstanding degree of causal specificity when compared to most non-living systems. This underlies the phenomenon that first attracted the label of 'specificity' in biology -the ability of organisms to develop in a very precise way, and to respond in a very selective and precise way to their circumstances. The idea that living systems differ from nonliving systems by being 'informed' -under the control of information -makes a great deal of sense in terms of our analysis of biological information as causal specificity. However, there is a great distance between a broad, philosophical interpretation like this and an actual scientific theory of the informational nature of living systems. In the final two sections we have reviewed some of the ideas that we think may form part of such a theory.
